Jan 24

　　The financial storm that blew up in America's subprime mortgage market last year has become a hurricane. The ill wind blasted first the market in securities, then banks' balance sheets and, most recently, stockmarkets. Across the globe, more than $5 trillion has disappeared from the value of public companies in the first three weeks of January. Many markets are 20% or more below their highs, the informal definition of a bear market. On January 21st share prices plunged from Brazil to Britain in the worst day of trading since September 11th 2001.

　　Although America's exchanges were closed that day, its policymakers' response was more than commensurate. Before Wall Street opened on January 22nd the Federal Reserve announced an unscheduled rate cut of three-quarters of a percentage point, to 3.5%, its fastest easing in a quarter of a century. A day later the New York insurance regulator and leading banks began work on a multi-billion-dollar plan to rescue the country's teetering bond insurers. As the markets pitch and yaw the pressing question is whether central bankers and regulators have acted with swift prudence, or ill-judged panic.

　　There is no doubt that this is a frightening moment. But the narrow economic rationale for the Fed's emergency rate-cut this week was thin. America's weak economy means monetary policy can, and should, be loosened considerably. But the central bankers' next scheduled meeting begins on January 29th. Since lower interest rates take several months to work through the economy, accelerating rate cuts by a few days will not much affect the outcome. Yes, share prices had been falling sharply across the globe, but the slide was orderly and the system had not seized up. The Fed seems to have been spooked, and wanted to stop the markets' fall.    

　　Rather than chasing the market's tail, the Fed ought to be asking what the markets' fall really signals. The answer is: unsurprising judgments that should not have led it to panic.